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CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

DISCUSSION
DR. HEUSER: I shall try to respond to Mr. Clough's questions.
First, as far as the problem of travel is concerned, there is no
problem at all for private persons. Germans get letters of
introduction at private ROC agencies such as Far Eastern Trade
Center and use the letters to get visas at Taipei airport. With
respect to Taiwanese-Chinese travelling to Germany, they,
through travel agencies in Taiwan, get their visa at the German
Consulate-General in Hong Kong. As far as official travel is
concerned, I can only say that official travelers do not travel
officially, neither from Germany to Taiwan nor vice-versa.
As to trade fairs, there was one trade fair held in 1969, and
none since, perhaps for political reasons.
I found it very interesting to deal with the question of
comparison of trade. In order to understand economic relations,
you have to make a comparison with those countries which are
economically similar in their structure, for example, Korea and
Taiwan. For example, German trade with Korea is very similar in
structure and in quantity to Taiwan. But we are realizing that
investors seem now to prefer Taiwan. German investments in
Korea are still a little bit more than in Taiwan, but this seems to
be changing and Taiwan is getting more interesting to German
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investments in spite of the fact that Taiwan's labor costs are

higher than in other countries in Asia or Indonesia. But German
investors have appreciated very much the development in Taiwan.
As far as France is concerned, France has, as far as I know,
no approved investment at all in Taiwan. Trade between France
and Taiwan is also limited. After 1964, when France established
diplomatic relations with the PRC the trade relations did not
increase at all. On the other hand, at the same time West German
trade increased with ROC. Summarizing, the status of diplomatic
relations between European countries and Taiwan does not affect
the quantity of trade with Taiwan.
DR. SIGUR: Thank you. We'll be entertaining questions and
comments from the floor. Are there any questions?
MR. LITTELL: I would like to ask you [apparently referring to
Chairperson Dr. Sigur] certain questions.
Do you not think that we should take a position clarifying
relations with Taiwan by eliminating all reference to it in the
Shanghai Communique of 1972, which has virtually the effect of a
treaty as it is being treated from administration to administration?
Secondly, not one word has been said in this conference about
the danger of the excessive importation of opium, heroin, and
derivative undermining products of which the PRC is the
principal producer in the world. Not Turkey as one would suppose,
but the PRC, over 65 percent. I did not touch upon this subject in
my paper because it was not germane to the subject of private
enterprise and investment, but it hurt my conscience. I think we
should be alerted to that frightening problem.
DR. SIGUR: I suppose as Chairman I might step out of that
position for a minute and respond, though I would like the
thoughts of members of the panel also. It seems to me that a
clarification of our relationship with the ROC and the PRC could
be beneficial, I think, if done properly. The problem, of course,
comes from the confusion within the American government itself
on this issue. The President, after all, has taken the position in the
campaign in which he referred to the determination to maintain
the independence and freedom of Taiwan. That is the statement
that he used in his foreign policy debate with then-President Ford.
I don't think that he has officially ever retreated from that
position. He has, I think, in the past couple of months made
references on one or two occasions to the People's Republic
perhaps, but he has simply never retreated from that. In the
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Congress of the United States, the House of Representatives
passed a resolution in support of the continuation of American
guarantees to Taiwan. This has never been repudiated. It's my
feeling that if it were put to the House of Representatives for a
resolution again on that issue, it would once again be strongly
supported. I think all developments, as of now, indicate the
strength that our government has, if it has the will and
determination, to stand by our commitments to the Republic of
China in Taiwan. I think that's the crux of the matter. When we
negotiate with Peking, perhaps we are doing so now, on the
question of diplomatic recognition or whatever we want to call it,
the normalization process, I think that the American position, as
you say, should be a tough one, a strong one: this is where we
stand. If we intend to take a normalization position, it must be
within the framework of the American commitment to an ally, in
our interests in terms of our broad security and political and
economic interests totally to retain the closest possible ties. I look
at it, of course, from many sides in terms of our relations with the
Soviets, with the PRC in Southeast Asia. When you get down to it
and look at the complexity of all this, it would be destabilizing for
the United States to retreat from its firm commitment to Taiwan.
Whether the President has to come out fully and restate this
again, whether it would be advisable for him to do so, is
something I hope the other people on this panel might have
comments about. Mr. Morell, can you speak on that issue?
MR. MORELL: This is more a political issue than I promised to
speak of, but I certainly agree with you that the President has
taken the position as you describe it. If he were to go further than
that, he would be obliged to go into formalities and details which I
presume he is not prepared to do at this time. I yield to Ralph
Clough on this.
DR. SIGUR: Ralph, could you comment on that?
MR. CLOUGH: Well, I think the problem is pretty clear. The
President on the one hand has said that he intends to pursue the
process of normalizing relations with the PRC and on the other
hand he has spoken of Taiwan; "independence and freedom" were
the two words he used. Since then Secretary of State Vance has
said that he regards the security of Taiwan as essential to the
United States. So I think the problem is how to reconcile these two
somewhat contradictory statements. This requires a lot of study.
DR. SIGUR: Anyone else have any comments?
DR. Wu: I have some comments on some other points.
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DR. SIGUR: On this particular point. What about the issue
which was also raised about the drug trade? Anyone have any
comments on it?
MR. MORELL: I cannot speak to this as a member of the
government, and I cannot speak with authority; perhaps Ralph
can. I know it's not a popular thing to say, but I have never seen a
report in the U.S. government that would. support the proposition
that there is a substantial flow of opium from the PRC.

DR. SIGUR: Do you know, Ralph?
MR. CLOUGH: My understanding is that most of the produc-

tion comes from the so-called "golden triangle," Laos, Thailand,
and southern Burma. How much comes from there is anybody's
guess.
DR. KING-YUH CHANG: I would like to make two comments.
First, I think that it is very difficult for citizens of the Republic of
China to travel very freely in countries without formal diplomatic
relations. For instance, in the case of going to a country without
diplomatic relations with the ROC to attend an academic meeting.
It would take months to get a visa because there is no official
representative from those countries in Taiwan and you have to
apply via other nations. It's very time consuming to get visas, and
in this period of rapid change obviously our merchants who need
to take care of their business very fast cannot do so because of the
inconvenience of getting visas.
Secondly, I would like to comment on Mr. Linstrom's
comment about the nuclear treaty and future security arrangements with the United States. I think that I myself consider the
treaty and security arrangements with the United States to be a
most vital issue in the ROC. We will not develop nuclear weapons.
We need nuclear power but not nuclear weapons. We do not want
that kind of freedom to develop nuclear weapons. Also in this, if
countries need that kind of freedom, then obviously Japan, the
United Kingdom, or Germany knows that with that kind of
freedom it can abandon its treaty commitments with the United
States.
MR. LINSTROM: The comment I would make I am inclined to
express in terms of real politics and that is something that we in
the United States on occasion tend not to do. I would stand by the
point that sometimes, I am not advocating the abrogation of the
treaty with the ROC or taking a position on it, just pointing out
that sometimes treaties like this tend to create a dependence
relationship that is not particularly healthy for the independence
and strength, strong development, of one of the countries. And I
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think that a careful examination of the relationships in the past
twenty years in certain key areas, areas that I think of vital
importance to the Republic of China, its independence and its
stature in the world, may indeed have been hampered by this
treaty and the way it has been utilized by the United States
government to put pressure upon the government of the Republic
of China.
DR. WEI: I want to talk about what Dr. Chang said. By the
way, Dr. Chang is Chairman of the Diplomacy Department at
National Chengchi University. You must see the consequences of
your suggestions. We have seen a lot of creative ideas, we have no
shortage of friends, friends to advance suggestions to get us out of
this difficult situation. You mention our nuclear policy. Some of
you have mentioned Russian intervention. You have mentioned
about separation and independence. On all these matters after
very close examination I see something very serious. A very
important factor that I think we should keep in mind is that the
ROC now and in the future is a normal political entity, normal in
the sense that we conduct our business as a good member of the
international community. We want to maintain our credibility and
maintain ourself as a contributing member to the stability and
peace in the world. That's a very important factor and that puts
us in a position of no alternative: our survival is at stake. We
cannot adopt any policy which will have more importance than
that function, a function which changes all the rules of the game.
We have not reached the point yet where we relinquish that
function.
Let me come to a few more concrete comments. One reality is
that many of us who are doing evaluations on the future of Taiwan
are also involved in its future, such as the Export-Import Bank.
You assess Taiwan's future, but what you do has got something to
do with the future of Taiwan. The men whom we are dealing with
have friends in Taiwan, some of them owners of large firms. They
ask our opinion: Do you think I should move my factory to
somewhere else? et cetera. You say, gosh, I don't know, we're
trying to see Taiwan stabilize. He's the guy asking the question,
what do you think of Taiwan? Should I move out? My opinion is
that if you move out you hurt Taiwan's future. It's very simple.
That large factory is itself determining in some way Taiwan's
future, so I think this element should be kept in mind. Many of
you U.S. scholars in important articles explaining Taiwan's
future, good or bad, you yourself hold the function of injecting
some variables into the thinking of people, which in turn will
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decide in some way Taiwan's future development. In any case,
prudence and some sympathy are important in this area.
As to the suggestion that maybe Taiwan's people should
invest in the United States. That's an interesting proposition.
However, again, this will be dependent on the confidence that we
have in the future of Taiwan's prosperity and stability. If
somehow people are still wondering about the future of Taiwan,
then we have a very liberal policy toward them as merchants and
entrepreneurs to invest in the U.S. If we allow a large number of
factories and firms in Taiwan to move out to the U.S., what it
would amount to is escape of very needed capital investment in
Taiwan, where Taiwan is concerned. So all this is very important
to feelings of confidence, of security, of continued existence as a
normal state, a normal government. We are not honored, we do
not feel comfortable, to be mentioned as "only people." The ROC
is a member of the international community. We are a government
controlling a territory. We do not want to be regarded as a people
only. We do not want to be transformed from a normal state, a
normal government, into only a non-state entity, and only to be
identified as a people.
QUESTION [speaker unidentified]: This question is directed
toward Professor Wu. Historically, the U.S. investment opportunities in a country and their investments in the U.S. have not
included the nationals of the country in top level management
and policy-making positions. Does the U.S. follow that same
policy with respect to investment in Taiwan, and if it does, are
there any moves in Taiwan to include the people of Taiwan in
policy-making positions? Or do you think that isn't important?
Will it have any bearing on future trade relations with the
Taiwanese people?
DR. WU: I'd like to answer this question, but before I get there
I'd like to take this opportunity to get off my chest a number of
points, if you'll bear with me for a moment. I would like to point
out, as I think Dr. Chang has already hinted, that the question is
not whether one can or cannot carry on trade without diplomatic
relations. Trade can be carried on with countries without
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But if you look at the future
there are certain changing conditions, one of which is the need for
Taiwan to continue to increase its trade in circumstances in which
many existing markets are taking protectionist attitudes. This
means that for Taiwan to continue to expand trade it would be
necessary to diversify by commodity, to diversify by market, it
would be necessary to be very quick on the beat, to respond
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quickly to changing conditions and go to markets where
possibilities appear at the first hint of information. That means
you have to be very quick, you cannot delay, and you have to have
access. It's not a question whether you eventually can get in
somewhere, but whether you can get there now. This is the first
point.
Secondly, with delay, with uncertainty, suppose you could go
to a certain place and then get a visa at the airport. But suppose
you arrive at the airport and can't get in, something has
happened, then what? Does not this kind of uncertainty increase
your risk and increase your accounts? With that effect you are
defenseless in these tenuous conditions.
The second point I'd like to make is that just as we have on
the political ground the difference between Japan's applying the
Japan formula while the U.S. and the ROC are still maintaining
normal diplomatic relations, there is a difference between that
and the U.S. applying the Japan formula when there is no third
party maintaining this kind of relations. We've got to think not in
what has been called partial equilibrium terms, where you change
one factor and everything else remaining constant, but we have to
think of conditions where you change one factor and everything
else changes. You no longer can apply this example.
A third thing I'd like to mention. There was some reference
yesterday, I believe, to the fact that the ROC is now able to
finance its own investments and therefore a question was raised
as to whether foreign investment is still necessary. I'd like to
make some points in that connection. The first is that foreign
investments have, as I mentioned in the paper, performed the
function of export markets. You have got to be able to sell in an
increasingly larger number of markets. That you can produce is
one thing, but you've got to be able to sell your product. The
second point is that with large infrastructure investments, such as
those of the ten major construction projects, there is still the need
for financing on a larger scale. This is the kind of borrowing in
connection with Eximbank and so on that we are talking about.
And thirdly, I would say that for businessmen interested in the
ROC in the future, one should explore perhaps more the possibility
of foreign technology and ROC capital, that is, joint ventures
under some kind of licensing arrangements. These will present
greater possibilities for the future.
In that connection I come to the question that was raised
earlier. I believe that U.S. practice in Asia has been different from
Japanese practice in the past. That is, American firms tend to
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give more opportunities to local nationals at a higher level, and
there are greater opportunities for advancement. Mr. Morell can
correct me, but I don't think there is an exception to this rule in
the case of Taiwan.
Finally, let me just speak on the point raised by Mr. Clough
on the prospects of PRC trade with the United States. In some
studies that my colleagues and I have done in the past based on
the records up to 1970 or so, we came to the conclusion that aside
from price changes, the long-term trend in the growth of PRC
exports (to the U.S.) was probably in the neighborhood of two to
three hundred million dollars a year, and that this kind of export
growth would never get very far unless Peking can develop new
exports. And this was when people became excited when Peking
began to export oil, but the prospects of Peking oil are somewhat
more doubtful than once estimated. In particular, some recent
events have created new problems at least for the next few years,
one of which was the sharp setback suffered by the coal industry
from the earthquake. As you know, the earthquake of July 1976
destroyed the Tanshan coal mines. These mines had a production
in the neighborhood of 20 million tons a year, which roughly is
equivalent to 10 million tons of crude oil, which is all that the PRC
has been able to offer in export.
DR. SIGUR: Thank you. I think we're getting past our hour
here, and I did promise to allow Mr. Chao of the Chinese Embassy
to correct something that he said.
MR. CHAO: This concerns a statement that I made concerning
the Republic of China's membership in GATT. Actually the ROC
has never been a member, but has participated in GATT meetings
as observer.*
DR. SIGUR closed the meeting with appreciation to Dr. Chiu,
Mr. Simon, and their colleagues.
Reported by Joyce Seunarine

* Editors' Note: The ROC provisionally applied to the GATT on May 21,
1948, but notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the cessation of
that application on March 6, 1950. Multilateral Treaties in respect of which the
Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions (List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as of 31 December 1975) (U.N. Doc. St/Leg/Ser. D19), at 237.
See discussion of Session ft, supra at p. 121.

